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In discussing changing executive leadership in the
Philippines, one can be aggregative, looking for patterns and
trends in the backgrounds and behaviour of the group studied, or
one can be personalistic, identifying specific individuals and
focusing on their styles and influences as executive leaders. In this
paper, I will use both approaches, though leaning more toward the latter.
Hence, the approach used is more impressionistic than statistical,
based more on a personal knowledge of the changing situation than
an analysis of aggregate data.
Discussion is focused on changes in the past ten years
which cover the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal
(1962-65) and that of President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1966present).
Within the latter administration, changes during the first terM of
President Marcos (1966-69) and those that have occurred in his second
term will be looked into. Background and historical data and infor-
mation from other studies will be used to highlight the changes observed
during the period. Some speculation will also be made on possible
changes in executive leadership that may occur in the Philippines
in the near future.
Background on Executive Structures
It has been observed that the President of the Philippines,
more than his American counterpart, is vested with more formal powers
which are rooted in the country's legal system, political style,
cultural origins and historical background. 1 The government upholds
the. principles of separation of powers and checks and balances but
even in the Constitution, the framers intended the President to be
dominant for they wanted an Executive "who shall rule unembarrassed"'
and get his programs implemented. 2 As Chief Executive, Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, head of the ruling political party and even
"Father of his People'", (during President Manuel L. Quezon's time),the
President plays a dominant role and dictates the patterns of executive
changes in the country.
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Changing executive leadership in the Philippines, there-
fore, depends heavily- on the particular approach and style of the
President. This approach and style, of course, depends on the man's
personality, his relationships with Congress and the Supreme Court,
demands made upon him by interest groups and citizens and other
factors. It is reflected in the choice of top executives the President
names to the Cabinet, his close personal advisers, and, to a lesser
degree, the types of people appointed to the higher civil service.
Types of Executives
In choosing executives who work for him, the President
may choose any of the following tyres: professional politicians,
political administrators, or technocrats. Technocrats, in turn may
be divided into business executives, civil servants or academics.
These types, of course, are based on modal characteristics. Any
one executive may possess certain characteristics that mayplace him
in any of the categories mentioned above. Placing him under a specific
category, therefore, will be dependent on the traits that most describe
him, usually as others see him.
In this study of changes in Philippine executive leadership,
attention will be focused on shifts and patterns denoting what parti-
cular type of executive predominates in the President's team. Such
shifts and patterns may be empirically observed, as in the exit of
one executive type and the entry of another. Others may just be
subjectively assessed from Presidential actions, the rumors that
invariably fly around power centers, or chance discussions with those
concerned.
The types of executives mentioned above may be described
as follows:
The professional politician is usually an elective official
or an active party member. He may be recuested by the President to give
up his elective or party post and take on an executive position, or,
more often, he may have just lost an election and is appointed to
an executive position to harness his energies, keep him loyal,
satisfy his constituents, or even genuinely help the President.
The professional politician will most likely have a bailiwick,
usually having taken the road from local tc national politics.
In his executive job, it is generally assumed that political objectives
will color his decisions, for the benefit of his supporters, the party,
or the President. Examples of such executives include incumbent Secretary
for Agrarian Reform Conrad° P. Estrella, Secretary for General Services
Constancio Castaneda, or former Secretary of Justice Juan Liwag.
The experience or backgroand of the poli bical administrator
may not be as obvious as the professional politician but this does
nct mean that he is less of a politician. Usually, the political
administrator is a politician in the making. He may not have a
political bailiwick nor electoral experience but he probably toiled
in and for the party. His appointment may be due both to his accomplish-
ments or image as a doer and his future reputation as a definite comer.
In performing his executive tasks, he may be expected to take efficiency
and effectiveness as well as political pay-offs into consideration.
Examples of such executives include former Executive Secretary Pafael
Salas, former Commerce and Industry Secretary (now Senator) Ernesto
Yaceda, or the current Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Fnrile.
The technocrat is usually chosen for personal skills and
assets rather than political reasons. He may be an academic, a civil
servant, a military officer, civic leader, or a well known journalist
or labor leader. The important thing is that he adds a semblance
of professionalism, technical know-how, and even idealism and.good
looks to the President's team.
Among technocrats, the business executive may be given an
executive position by the President in recognition of actual or
imputed managerial, technical and ether talents. Often, the business
executive recruited for a top executive job has achieved considerable
wealth or a reputation as an entrepreneur or manager. He may have
participated actively in gettirythe President elected but for image-.
building purposes, this fact may not be mentioned openly. Public claims
may be made, in fact, that the business executive is taking on a public
duty at financial and personal sacrifices. Examples of business
executives drafted for public duty include former Chairman of the
National Economic Council Sixto K. Foxas, current Secretary of Public
Works and Communication David Consunji, or even the present Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Arturo Tarco, Jr.
Claims about a non-political team in the President's
Cabinet are also made when career civil servants are appointed to
top executive positions. Most career civil servanto consider the post
of Undersecretary- of a department as the highest possible level they
can attain. They may be made Acting Secretary during transition periods
or when no politically acceptable candidate is chosen by the President
but generally, the chances of their landing a fali-pledged Cabinet
level job are considered slim. Now and then, however, the President
may choose a technocratic career civil servant for various reasons.
Examples of such executives include Commissioner of the Budget Faustino
SyChangco rho has served three Presidents; Secretary Juan V.anuel of
the Department of Education or the late Paulino Garcia, Secretary of
health in the 14acapagal administration.
The technocrat par excellence, of course, is the academic
who is offered a key executive position. Such an executive is usually
widely known and respected as an expert in a particular field
(economics and finance, political science or public administration, law
or medical. science). He may be a young, energetic "whiz kid" or a
more established.and respectable authority on a specific subject.
Generally, the claim is made that he was drafted for his Inowledge
and skills and to enable the Government to provide effective and efficient
services to the people. Examples of academics who have held top executive
positions include current Chairman of the National Economic Council
Gerardo P. Sicat, incumbent Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata,
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, Secretary of Commerce and
Industry, Troadio Quiazon, Jr., former Secretary of Education Onofre
D. Corpuz, and Secretary of Social Welfare Estefania Aldaba-Lim.
Changing Patterns
Taking into consideration the types of executives mentioned
above, the following generalizations may be made:
Professional politicians were more important during
the Macapagal administration, especially when the
President decided to run for re-election in 1965.
Political administrators dominated the first years
of the Marcos aaministration although professional
politicians became relatively important during the
re-election campaign in 1969.
Since President Marcos started his second term in
1970, technocrats rather than political administrators
or professional politicians have predominated.
The Macapagal Years. The administration of President
Diosdado Macapagal was ushered in with great reform expectations
and hopes for accelerated economic and social development in the
whole country. Macapagal held a Ph.D. in Economics, was a poor
farm boy who made good, and his honesty was almost legendary.
Coming so closely to the widely discredited administration of the
late President Carlos P. Garcia, Macabagal was hailed as a great
reformer. Garcia had never quite come out from under the dominant
image of the late President Ramon Magsaysay. Some of that President's
charisma, identification with the masses and clean and honest reputation
were evoked by Macapagal.
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Macapagal started very well with a technocratic team,
mostly of business executi ves recruited into hey Cabinet positions.
Sixto K. Roxas, prominent businessman and economist, was nade Director
of the Program Implementation Agency, the President's main coordina-
ting machinery. When coordination between long range economic and
social planning and program implementation became a problem, Roxas
was appointed Chairman of the National Economic Council, the country's
long range (sectoral) planning agency. Another technocrata young
professor of economics and Vice President of a private university
named Armand Fabella was made director of the PIA (later changed to
the President's Economic Staff). A career civil servant, Dominador
Aytona, was named Budget Commissioner, to coordinate the fiscal programs
of the government with the economic and social development plans and
programs.
These early promising starts, however, did not last long.
The Macapagal administration was plagued with foreign exchange problems,
unemployment, and unsuccessful grandious programs such as the attempt
to provide employment through make-work projects. Roxas resigned from
his Cabinet position and attributed most of the administration's
failures to "a crisis in management". Fabella tried to carry on the
economic tasks but with the 1965 elections looming in the horizon,
politics become more and more important as an ingredient in govern.-
mental decisions. Eventually, Macapagal had to fall back on old political
cronies, some of these harking back to his small town politics days.
However, the challenge of President Ferdinand E. Marcos was too strong
(Marcos had crossed over from the Liberal to the opp,ssition Nacionalista
Party) and he won the 1965 elections.
The First Marcos Term. Like the early Macapagal years, the
first term of President Marcos was characterized by change and
reform. Unlike Macapagal, however, Marcos turned to political adminis-
trators instead of technocrats. His early commitments were simplified
into the slogan of "Rice and Roads". Most of the resources of the
government were devoted to achieving self-sufficiency in rice and to
the construction of infrastructures (roads, irrigation, schools, airports,
harbors).
To many knowledgeable people in the Philippines, the early
Marcos years should really be considered the Salas years. For it was
an open secret that most of the successes in the rice and roads programs
were due to the efforts of Rafael M. Salas, Executive Secretary.
Salas was a young civil.servant who had a law degree from the University
of the Philippines and an MPA from Harvard. He had worked for the
National Economic Council and for the University of the Philippines.
Those close to him knew he had political ambitions for he came from a
political family in the sugar-producing Negros provinces but his
reputation vas earned primarily as an executive.
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Another political administrator who toiled hard and long
during the early Marcos years was Manuel Sycuio, a communications engineer
and expert who did not quite enjoy the status and prestige accorded to
Salas but who nevertheless was closer to the President in mony ways.
As Undersecretary of National Defense, Sycuio was instrumental in the
unique monitoring system which made possible the effective coordination
of the rice and roads program. From the infrastructure Operations
Center, Syquio and'his communication experts (many- of whom were in
the Army) collected, analyzed and fed information to the Chief
Executive on a continuing basis. Even when Syquio admitted to being
reponsible for the unfortunate "Jabidah Affair" when special forces
being trained by the Army for possible infiltration into Malaysia
rebelled and exposed the whole thing, he still remained close to the
President and had his say in executive decisions.
While President Marcos relied on political administrators
like Salas and Syquio for administrative and rrogram results, he
maintained his contacts with old political friends. To some extent,
this was forced on him by the Nacionalista Party elite who did not
particularly like the way the President was running the country and the
party. As re-election time drew closer, the role of professional
politicians around Marcos became more pronounced. Such cronies from
"locos politics days as Antonio Racuiza and Floro Crisologo
were placed in key positions. The 1969 elections gave Marcos an
overwhelming victory but his tactics of "political overkill" alienated
some of the political administrators and technocrats who had been
so instrumental in his achievement of administrative programs and projects.
The Second Marcos Term. The administration of President
Marcos since 1970 has been mainly technocratic rather then politically
administrative. To some extent, this was due to electoral victories
of some key political administrators (former Secretary for Community
Development and later Secretary of Commerce and Industry Ernesto Maceda
was elected tothe Senate while Manuel Elizalde, Jr., who was in charge
of cultural minorities is still contesting a Senate seat): A number of
important administrators and technocrats also resigned (Rafael Salas,
Cnofre D. Corpus, Dioscoro Umali, Placido Mapa, Jr., Leonidas Virata,
and Gregorio Feliciano being the most prominent among these). Finally,
political differences between President Marcos and his friends also
decreased the number of key executives who were non-technocrats
(Vice President Fernando Lopez resigned from his Cabinet position as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Manuel Syquio dropped
out of the scene, Crisologo died).
Depending on what political group you listen te in he
Philippines, there seem to be two ways of looking at the current rei
of technocrats. Those who are pro-Marcos assert that the aveilability
of technocrats is only l''_8TCOS' attempt to keep politics out of govern-
ment and to achleve results. They claim that since Marcos is no longer
available for another presidential term, he is doing his best to aohieve
economic and social development for the country. Hence, he has asked
for the services of young and non-political technocrats, who view their
jobs mainly- as efforts to achieve developmental goals.
Those critical of the Marcos administration, hovver, point
to the non-political nature of the Marcos technocracy as only a
reflection of the President's desire to centralize power unto himself
and to perpetuate himself in power. They assert that Marcos cannot
bear to share the limelight with anyone. They point to the differences
that resulted in the resignation and going abroad of Rafael Salas as
proof of this personalist tendencies. A former Cabinet member who
had resigned explained to this author what prompted him to quit.
"I suddenly realized'", he said, "that I was instrumental in merely
brclonging the reign of a President whose programs 1 did not believe
in any more and a person I had lost trust in. The President had
changed. He had become corrupted by his power. So, I quit because
did not want to contribute toward the continuation of that power".
The Present Marcos Team
Looking into the backgrounds of the key executives around
President Marcos toda, it is difficult to miss the technocratic character
of the pectic closest to the President. The 18 Cabinet members or
persons with Cabinot rank and 19 Undersecretaries with sub-Calainet
rank are mostly professonals and career administrators who are
known for their accomplishments and reputatione than their ee'tice7
connections.
One striking fact about the hey executives in
Government at present is their youth. Table 1 shows that d o
18 Cabinet members are on the younger side of forty -- Franiscc
Tatad, the President's Press Secretary is 23, Gerardo "Gcoe"
Chairman of the National Economic Council is 36, and sucL nerc
as Cesar Virata, Arturo "Bong" Tanco, Jr., Adrian Cristobal,
"Alex" Melchor are barely O.
The educational attainment of the membe,:s
Cabinet is also noteworthy. As shown in Table 2, 24 of
executives had either Masters or Ph.D. degrees, most of tH
institutions of higher learning abroad (Sicat has a Ph.P.
from MIT, Tanco an MBA from Harvard, and Romulo has so PP1:.
Ph.D's from abroad it is difficult to keep track of thom).
Traditionally, higher civil servants in the Philippines had
law degrees, as revealed in a pioneering work by Francisco. 3 in some
ways, the persistence of this trend is still shown in Table 3, where more
than 50 per cent of Undersecretaries (who tend to te more reflective
of the traditional features of the civil service) have law degrees. As
fax as Cabinet members are concerned, however, the dominance of lawyers
seems to have sharply declined. In fact, only five out of 18 Cabinet
members studied law, and most of these officials combined a legal edu-
cation with other fields such as business or economics. The increasing
importance of technical education is seen in the number of engineers,
economists, and other professionals among Cabinet members and higher
civil servants.
The technocratic character of the,top executives in the
Ph,ilippines at present is seen in Table h, which reveals the professions
of such-executives. Among Cabinet members, academics accounted for the
largest group, followed closely by businessmen, civil servants and
educators. Only two members of the Cabinet may be classified as
"professional politicians" and neither of these may be called, traditional
or old-line politicos. Among the undersecretaries, careerism seems to
be reflected in the fact that 11 out of 19 officials were civil servants,
indicating that merit rather than political patronage seemed to have
guided the President in choosing these mem:cers to his team.
Finally, the image of merit rather than partisan or
other considerations as a guide in selecting the key executives in
the Philippines is considerably burnished by the ethnic background of the
executives. in the multi-ethnic Philippine society, political partisanship
usually follows language or regional cultural lines. Thus, it has
been said of Macapagal that he surrounded himself with officials from
his home province of Pampanga chile the joke around Malacanang nowadays
is that ilocano has replaced Filipino as the national language within
the confines of the Presidential Palace. However, as shown in Table ),
language and cultural lines do not seem to 1.1e too important in the
selection of key executives anymore. About 12 out of 18 Cabinet members
may be considered Tagalogs, either from their nrovince of origin or
their long residence and identification with Manila. and other Tagalog-
speaking places. While President Narcos is Ilecano, there are only two
easily identifiable ilocanos in his Cabinet. There are relatively more
Ilocanos among the Undersecretaries but the T)roportion of Tagalogs
remairlshigh. It is noworthy that no juslim is rerresentative in the
President's team and that the proportion of Visayans is very small.
In terms of what the predominance cf technocrats in the
executive leadership in the Philippines means, an inescapable conclusion
from the present facts seem to indicate a trend toward greater centralism
and consolidation of power in the Presidency. First of all, among the
members of President Marcos' official femily, there is no one who can
provide even the potentials of politica/ challenge. General Homulo,
the most prominent member of the Cabinet is an elder statesman in the
twilight of his career. Alejandro Melchor, who occupied the "Little
President" position so ably held by Salas before, is an efficient and
true technocrat. It can be truly said, therefore, that the President's
team is not one of "stars" but of "supporting casts". Thus, they serve
to further his will and to support his authority and power, instead of
sharing in it.
Conclusion and Speculations
But what about the future? What are the potential trends
in executive leadership in the Philippines?
Future changes will depend critically on what President
Marcos will do. There are two types of speculation on this. First,
there are those who believe that the current technocratic and relatively
non-political nature of the President's executive family are designed
to highlight the President's importance and greatness. These people
believe that Marcos will not voluntarily give up his authority and power
in 1973. They point to the present Constitutional Convention and the
influence that the President exerts over its proceedings as an example.
They believe that changes in the Constitution will be introduced,
enabling the President to yet seek another term and to continue his
work.
A. rather troublesome variant of this "Marcos will stay"
scenario paints a violent picture. In this version, the Constitutional
Convention cannot be swayed into allowing another term for the President.
The President insists on staying, there are riots, assassinations and
open violence, and the President declares martial lay. No elections
are held and the President rules by decree. The relatively nonepolitical
technocrats continue to serve him and are loyal to him and the country.
Another .speculation has the President giving way but
setting up the First Lady, Imelda Marcos, as the presidential candidate.
In this scenario, the First Lady wins by a very narrow margin amidst
charges of cheating, vote buying, terrorism and graft and corruptien.
President Marcos still governs, with the First Lady as a figure head.
Again, technocrats rather than professional politicians or political
administrators will play important executive roles.
A final version, of course, has both President and Mrs.
,:arcos giving way willingly or unwillingly and the Liberal Party,
under the leadership of Senator Gerardo Roxas and/or Senator Benigno
Acuino, assuming power. With this change in power, what possible changes
ir executive leadership can be expected?
If Roxas a,nd'Aouino win, they will probably start out
as reformers and try to project a professional, technocratic and
non-r.;:21itical image. Hence, the trend toward political administrators
and technocrats may continue. Of course, some political workhorses have
to be rewarded, but such rewards may not necessarily be in the form of
executive positions.
Roxas and Aquino will most likely be influenced by the
fact that their following is mostly young, idealistic, left-of-
center, and critical of old-line politics. Thus, the combination
of reformist stance, internal Liberal Party pressures, and. the expecta-
tions of student and leftist leaders may work toward the continuation
of the professional and technocratic stance. It looks, therefore,
that as far as executive leadership in the Philippines is concerned,
the trends toward a more technically qualified and less partisan
administration are markedly visible in the future.
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TABLE 1
Age of Top Executives
TABLE 2
Educational Attainment
Education Cabinet Members Undersecretaries
Undergraduate 1
Bachelors degree or equivalent 5 7
Masters degree 10 10
Doctorate 2 2
18 19
Age Cabinet Members Undersecretaries
Below 35 1
35 - 44 7 6
45 - 54 5 5
55 - 64 2 7







Military Science 1 1




General Education (BA) 3
18 19
TABLE 4
Profession Prior to Present Position
Cabinet Member Undersecretaries
Business= 2
Professional politician 2 1
Academic 5 2







Linguistic - Cultural Groups Cabinet Member
Tagalog 12
Ilocano 2
Bicolano 1
Pangasinan 1
Visayan
Pampango
18 19
Undersecretaries
7
7
2
1
